The Western Balkans are stepping back into the EU’s strategic spotlight. Last week the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Kaja Kallas, carved out time for a tour of the region, visiting Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. With so many issues competing for policymakers’ time, this matters. This tour was followed by a dinner between EU and Western Balkan foreign ministers on 13 April. On 14 April the Foreign Affairs Council discussed the Western Balkans, stressing the urgency of pushing forward with the enlargement process and underscoring the region’s stability and security as essential. The discussion also made it clear that any involvement in the Victory Day parade in Moscow on 9 May would be taken very seriously by the EU.
The EU should persist in signalling its resolve to prevent any political or security escalation.
The HR/VP’s visit to the region conveyed a clear message in that direction: the Western Balkans remain firmly on the EU’s radar. The choice of countries visited aligns with this message and was not coincidental: Albania and Montenegro as enlargement frontrunners, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose potential for instability carries wider regional implications.
The EU should persist in signalling its resolve to prevent any political or security escalation, for two critical reasons: (1) to safeguard the continuity of its enlargement policy, which depends on a safe and secure environment; and (2) to enable the Western Balkans to contribute meaningfully to the Union’s evolving defence agenda.
The EU wants to enlarge but cannot afford to wobble
Commissioner Kos has made the EU’s ambitions clear: ‘Montenegro and Albania could join by 2026 or 2027’. But talk about enlargement only works if the region is stable. Right now, it is not. And this poses a direct threat to the EU’s strategic goals.
In Serbia, protests show no sign of abating. How they will be politically articulated remains unclear, but the pressure is building up. Students have launched a symbolic ‘journey of hope’, cycling from Novi Sad to Strasbourg to demand that ‘European institutions exert pressure on the authorities and stand in defence of the rights of all those who are forced to remain silent.’ Their message is simple: Brussels can no longer look the other way.
The EU’s approach? Sit-and-wait – but this strategy risks backfiring. A politically stagnant Serbia cannot be a credible partner in the enlargement process. Nor can it move forward on the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, which remains frozen. With Kosovo[*] also facing political uncertainty and no new government yet in place, the entire process is locked in the cycle of uncertainty.
Yet so far, only the European Parliament is sounding the alarm. In its 9 April 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia, the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) called for ‘full and transparent legal proceedings and an official investigation into the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad and an impartial investigation into the alleged use of unlawful crowd control technology against protesters’. Meanwhile, President Vučić has appointed Dr. Đuro Macut, an endocrinologist with no political background, as prime minister-designate, tasked with forming a government. The pending formation of a new government has done little to defuse public anger, as protesters continue to press demands they say remain unmet.
Meanwhile, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite being under an active arrest warrant, Milorad Dodik has travelled freely – twice to Serbia, then to Israel, and most recently to Moscow. The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) has yet to act on the arrest warrant for him. The obstacle is both structural and political: enforcement within Republika Srpska, one of the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, requires cooperation from entity-level police, which is not forthcoming. Law enforcement officials have expressed concern that a confrontation with Milorad Dodik’s personal security team could pose serious risks, including possible casualties and subsequent unrest. The situation is likely to persist until a second-instance court ruling clarifies legal responsibilities, although whether enforcement will follow remains uncertain.
The Western Balkans are integral to the EU’s defence vision
During her visit to Albania, HR/VP Kallas launched the first EU–Albania Security and Defence Dialogue – a direct outcome of the Security and Defence Partnership signed in November 2024. A similar agreement was signed with North Macedonia. The partnerships allow, among other things, for structured cooperation between partner countries and the European Defence Agency (EDA). Serbia already has an agreement with the EDA – joining a small group of non-EU countries (Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine). These developments take on added significance in light of the recently adopted Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. While the region is not central to the document, its inclusion is deliberate, a signal that alignment with the EU’s security agenda could secure continued relevance.
The region has several avenues through which it can contribute meaningfully to European security. These include more participation in peacekeeping operations (including ongoing contributions to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU Battle Groups, EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA in the Central African Republic, EUNAVFOR Aspides and EUNAVFOR Atalanta, among others). Additional contributions could come in the form of continued financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine, integrated border management, and serving as a strategic facilitator for the movement of troops and equipment, notably via infrastructure projects like Corridor VIII and the planned Porto Romano Port. The Western Balkans also possess a legacy defence industry and infrastructure which, although outdated, could be modernised to align with EU strategic objectives. Serbia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia and Herzegovina, already play a role through arms exports.
The direction is firmly set: the Western Balkans must move beyond being passive recipients of EU security guarantees and demonstrate that they can be credible contributors to Europe’s strategic autonomy. The White Paper sets the framework — but it is up to the region to step up. In a Union increasingly defined by security and resilience, the value each candidate brings will shape not just enlargement timelines, but perceptions of who belongs at the table. The choice is clear: be seen as essential, or risk being sidelined.
[*] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
