The emerging details of diverging US and European approaches to freezing Russia’s war in Ukraine are a testimony to the deepening chasm across the Atlantic. The Vatican meeting between Presidents Trump and Zelensky – one of those rare and fleeting moments when the clouds appear to clear – and the minerals agreement concluded earlier this week, do little to alter this fundamental reality.
From what can be gathered from earlier leaked documents, Washington is prepared to formally recognise Crimea de jure as part of Russia, effectively legalising Putin’s blatant act of daylight armed robbery. It is furthermore ready to allow Russia to dictate who can be invited to join NATO – the alliance that the US founded and has led for over seven decades; to remove economic sanctions that have been stifling the Russian economy; and to resume economic cooperation that could kickstart Russia’s stalling Arctic energy projects.
Ukraine gets back a small portion of the Kharkiv region, secures free navigation on the Dnieper river – which traverses territory that even the US does not intend to recognise as belonging to Russia – and gains the right to hand over its minerals (through preferential treatment for American companies in new mining projects), and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to the US. The prospects of EU membership are nominally preserved under the proposed ‘peace’ terms, yet in practice they are complicated by the provisions of the minerals agreement. These terms would likely contravene key aspects of the acquis communautaire that Ukraine needs to adopt before accession, notably environmental or competition law. Although the agreement does contain a clause allowing for future renegotiation in ‘good faith’ as Ukraine readies for EU membership, it is hard to imagine how any party to such a contract would willingly relinquish preferential treatment without opposition.
Moreover, the proposed peace plan lacks concrete provisions for Russian reparations, or mechanisms for enforcement of a ceasefire by Washington. Kyiv would be making major concessions that compromise its sovereignty – without receiving any security assurances from the US in return. The minerals agreement has been hailed by the White House as evidence that the US is taking an ‘economic stake in securing a free, peaceful and sovereign future for Ukraine’. However, the agreement offers no tangible security guarantees either – while underscoring that any potential future US military assistance to Ukraine would merely increase America’s capital contribution to the newly established joint investment fund.
It comes as little surprise that the US administration is ready to concede this much to the Kremlin.
It comes as little surprise that the US administration is ready to concede this much to the Kremlin. President Trump wants to end the conflict as swiftly as possible – whether by making it ‘disappear’ even if only superficially, or by having the US ‘vanish’ from the peace talks altogether – and to bring Russia on board in his great power gambit aimed at ‘making America great again’.
The uncomfortable fact is that, despite the rhetoric surrounding the minerals agreement, the Trump administration – mirroring the views of Putin and his regime – does not really recognise Ukraine as a sovereign state. Trump fears Russia (which ‘has cards’), and seems to believe he needs Russia to confront China, and pursue his broader project of building a new world order based not on institutions and rules but on ‘deals’. He neither fears nor needs Ukraine. To him, Ukraine’s security is insignificant when weighed against the interests of great powers – interests that, especially when its sovereign possessions are at stake, can be divided, in particular by the two powers with ‘special responsibilities’ for the fate of the world.
The perils of amateurish realpolitik
This is not only problematic from an ethical point of view, but also strategically unwise. In the realist school of international politics, ‘bandwagoning’ (alignment) represents a rare alternative to the more common strategy of balancing against competing threats and interests. Bandwagoning with a weaker competitor, however, is something truly revolutionary. Spoiler alert: this sort of amateurish realpolitik will not make America great again. It will empower the US’s rivals and send its great power decline into overdrive.
The terms proposed by the US are far out of step with Russia’s actual strength and position on the battlefield, both of which the Trump administration appears to overestimate – a testament to the apparent success of Moscow’s information warfare. Forcing Kyiv to accept them would undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty as well as Europe’s security. The Russians are careful not to push Trump past his breaking point. However, they may now feel increasingly confident that they can continue to ‘shark’ him – to borrow the poker term for preying on a weaker player – without risking overreach. Should the Kremlin succeed in this game (which it continues to play) and score a tactical victory in what it sees as a larger systemic confrontation with the West, why should Putin – especially in a ‘world according to Trump’ – feel compelled to restrain himself in his quest for power and glory? Ultimately, like Ukraine’s sovereignty, European security may not matter that much to Washington either. What should matter to it, however, is that giving in to Moscow would dramatically weaken Trump’s hand in future dealings with great powers and smaller powers alike.
Two sides of Mars
The EU and Ukraine’s framework for freezing the conflict is much more realistic. Any recognition of a new territorial status quo is to be avoided – an insistence that appears to have particularly irritated Trump’s team in discussions with Europeans, to the point of threatening to disengage (‘vanish’) from the negotiations. Sanctions relief can only be considered after any ceasefire proves sustainable; and only then can any wider settlement be seriously contemplated, following the appropriate sequence of steps. Given Russia’s track record (including notably the recent Easter and energy infrastructure ceasefires, which were marked by numerous violations), this cautious wait-and-see approach, combined with firm commitments to support Ukraine’s sovereignty, is clearly justified.
It is also more ‘Martian’ – to borrow the term used by Robert Kagan in his early 2000s essay, written during another transatlantic rift – demonstrating a clear understanding of the belligerent motives of Putinist Russia, which seeks to revise the status quo not just in Ukraine but across much of the continent, and to further reverse its imperial decline through global hybrid warfare. Europeans, admittedly, were never truly ‘from Venus’ in the first place. Now, however, they are more ‘Martian’ than MAGA.
Europeans must now become fully Martian – not by rejecting the rules and institutions that make the world more peaceful and predictable, but by exerting sufficient pressure on Russia to accept and abide by ceasefire terms that will lay the groundwork for a sustainable peace.
The European proposal recognises that caving in to Russia’s maximalist demands is no recipe for peace
How can this pressure be applied, and a message delivered in a language that Russia will understand?
First and foremost, by making a serious commitment to defend against and counter Russia’s aggression, possibly through a new defence pact (‘ Treaty 2.0’) that includes Ukraine as a member; as well as by practical measures such as joint defence industrial production involving Ukraine and supported by more ambitious loans (including defence bonds), long-term contracts and investment guarantees.
Then, by economic warfare measures, above all by issuing credible threats to further toughen trade and financial sanctions, thereby exerting additional supply-side pressures on Russia’s economy. The EU should moreover demonstrate resolve by assertively targeting the shadow fleet while pushing for an immediate, followed by a gradual further reduction in the oil price cap. In recent weeks, Urals oil has been trading at around $50 per barrel (10$ below the current cap) due to the US-induced disruptions to the global economy. This situation has led some Western corporate entities to swiftly re-enter the Russian oil shipping market.
The European proposal recognises that caving in to Russia’s maximalist demands is no recipe for peace. As a consequence, it is far removed now from what Moscow is ready to accept. This is not a flaw in the proposal but rather its virtue. A real, sustainable peace will have to be grounded in geopolitical realities. It will not be achieved through cheap parlour tricks. It can only be a peace forged through strength – Europe’s strength.
