Ever since the EU and the UK agreed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in December 2020, the focus of their relationship has been on its implementation. This has often been challenging, especially in relation to border arrangements in Northern Ireland. The EU-UK summit in London on 19 May marks the start of a new phase in the relationship: the focus is no longer on implementation but rather on deepening cooperation, both in security and defence and in the economic realm.
The conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) is one of the summit’s headline achievements. The TCA contained very few provisions for cooperation on security after former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson opted to abandon negotiations in this area. The lack of formal provisions has not prevented the EU and the UK from engaging in consultations over issues of mutual interest, and from cooperating closely in responding to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For example, British leaders have attended EU summits and there has been good collaboration on sanctions enforcement. However, the lack of a structured agreement meant that there was no regular rhythm of dialogue, and that cooperation tended to develop in a more ad-hoc reactive manner, especially on issues unrelated to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The SDP puts in place a more structured set of arrangements for regular dialogue and consultations that will underpin more intense informal exchanges at all levels – including potentially through mutual secondments of officials.
At the same time, the SDP paves the way for greater EU-UK cooperation on defence capability development, addressing the ‘defence gap’ that had emerged in EU-UK relations. There is a dense web of defence cooperation arrangements between the UK and individual Member States, underpinned by significant integration in the defence industrial sector, but no formal defence links exist between the EU and UK. That issue has become more salient as the EU’s role in defence industrial matters has grown, with new instruments to foster defence research and development and joint procurement and to encourage industry to expand production. The Commission’s proposed ReArm EU/Readiness 2030 plan is set to add €150 billion in low-interest defence loans to the mix, further increasing the EU’s importance. The Union’s defence industrial toolkit is aimed at strengthening the EU defence industry and ensuring that outputs are free from third-country restrictions. As a result, the EU’s ecosystem has been relatively closed to non-EU partners, with Norway and Ukraine being exceptions to the rule.
The conclusion of the SDP is a first step in changing the current arrangements and deepening EU-UK defence cooperation. There is now a clear pathway for the UK to participate in the EU’s SAFE programme to boost defence spending, although the EU and the UK will need to negotiate detailed arrangements for British involvement first. Specifically, they will have to agree on the financial contribution that the UK will make in exchange for participation, and on the criteria for eligibility of British defence firms to participate in individual SAFE-funded projects. If the EU and the UK can find a way forward on these issues, defence cooperation could deepen further. The compromise reached over SAFE could be extended to other EU instruments over time – such as the European Defence Fund or the incipient EU Defence Industrial Programme. The UK could also negotiate an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency, potentially allowing it to be more closely involved in its work to identify promising areas for joint cooperative military projects and to define capability requirements. There could also be scope for the UK to participate in more PESCO projects.
The conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership is one of the summit’s headline achievements.
Looking beyond defence and security, the summit also resulted in small but significant changes to the EU-UK economic relationship. Specifically, the UK has agreed to dynamically align with EU legislation in the field of plant and animal health. This will smooth cross-channel trade in food and agricultural products, reducing the need for checks. The agreement is more significant than it appears at first sight, because it marks the first instance of the UK agreeing to follow EU law in a specific economic sector. In theory this ‘dynamic’ alignment model could over time be extended to other sectors, such as chemicals or energy.
However, the hurdles to further deepening relations are high. Immediately after the Brexit vote in 2016, the UK defined its priorities as ending financial contributions to the EU budget and halting free movement, while insisting on regulatory autonomy and the freedom to strike autonomous trade deals. The new Labour government has marginally softened its position on regulatory autonomy with the agreement to align with EU food and agricultural legislation. However, Labour’s position on free movement, large payments into the EU budget, and the ability to strike free trade deals remains essentially unchanged, reducing the scope of what can be achieved.
In theory, the UK could further shift its position; but in practice this appears unlikely. Labour’s popularity has been decreasing, while the right-wing Eurosceptic Reform party, led by the arch-Brexiteer Nigel Farage, has performed very well in this month’s local elections and is currently polling as the largest party in the UK. Labour’s response to Reform’s rise has been to tack to the right on issues such as migration. For its part, the Conservative Party is also leaning further right. All this means that Labour will be reluctant to change its red lines towards the EU. Meanwhile, in light of Reform’s rising popularity the EU is likely to tread carefully in its approach to future relations with the UK.
The hurdles to further deepening relations are high.
While further big changes in EU-UK economic relations seem unlikely, additional pragmatic improvements to the relationship are possible. For example, the EU and the UK could agree to connect their carbon emissions trading systems, better co-ordinate their export controls or increase short-term work opportunities for their citizens. The biggest potential for deeper cooperation is in defence and security. Even here, though, progress will depend on domestic politics on both sides of the channel.
