In the months since Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed, Israel’s military activity in Syria has grown increasingly aggressive. The Israel Defense Force has seized the UN-monitored buffer zone created after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, conducted systematic strikes against Syria’s infrastructure—bombing air defense networks, weapons depots, missile systems, and intelligence capabilities—and built nine new military posts. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has repeatedly declared that the IDF will remain in Syria “indefinitely.” And in March, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced plans to create zones of influence by making alliances with minority groups, as well as to establish a 30-mile demilitarized area reaching from Israel’s nearly to Damascus.
All of this represents a sharp break with Israel’s longtime cautious approach toward its northeastern neighbor. Israel had felt that it could manage the Assad regime, and the IDF’s actions after December began as a prudent effort to prevent strategic capabilities from falling into less well-known hands. Israeli concern about Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, is warranted, given his past terrorist associations and the fact that his previous military moniker, al-Jolani, reflected his desire to free the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation. But now Israel is overreaching. After it took Damascus, Syria’s new regime bent over backward to signal that it had no interest in conflict with Israel and even floated the possibility of normalizing ties. The new Syrian government needs to be judged by its actions and not only its words. But it presents Israel with a potentially golden opportunity to deepen Iran’s isolation, turn Syria from a foe into a peaceful neighbor, and stabilize its region.
Although genuine national security concerns are driving the Israeli government’s approach to Syria, so is a yearning to prove its strength and willpower to its neighbors as well as its own citizens, who are deeply scarred by their government’s failure to protect the country’s borders on October 7, 2023. If Israel’s leaders give in to the impulse to ramp up its incursions into Syria, they may well create a new enemy when there is currently none. And Israel will put itself even more at odds with Turkey, driving both countries toward the brink of an unnecessary new military conflict. Instead, Israel must communicate that its territorial incursions are meant to be temporary, help ease Syria’s humanitarian crisis, and stop undermining Turkey’s attempts to help Shara stabilize the country and stand up to Iranian influence. Israel should also prepare to work with Damascus as long as it neither takes nor enables actions that threaten Israel’s security.
CHANGE OF HEART
Under a quarter century of rule by Assad, Syria became an integral part of Iran’s so-called axis of resistance. Assad worked to deepen his strategic alliance with Hezbollah, helping to transform the Lebanese militant group into a menacing terrorist army by allowing it to use Syrian arsenals and strategic capabilities that Assad received from Russia, such as advanced ballistic missiles and air defense systems. Israel was traumatized by its 2006 war against Hezbollah (which Hezbollah saw as a victory), and the Israelis spent the next decade mostly refraining from trying to disrupt Syria’s alliance with the group. When the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, Israel did try to prevent the consolidation of Hezbollah and Iran’s footholds in Syria by conducting what it called the “campaign between the wars,” focusing mainly on preventing Iran from smuggling weapons into Lebanon. But although Israel officially supported neither side in Syria’s civil war, Israeli leaders preferred Assad to his opponents, referring to him in private as the “devil we know” and making sure that Israel’s efforts to counter Iran’s growing influence would not risk his rule.
Israel’s approach in Syria did not immediately change following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 onslaught. But that devastating assault set changes in motion. The attack made it clear that Israel had misjudged both the intentions and capabilities of an adversary; it was clear that the country’s security services had also relied excessively on electronic monitoring to secure the border with Gaza. The lesson that many Israeli officials took was that their strategy of “quiet for quiet”—turning a blind eye to small provocations to avoid major conflict—had failed. Consequently, the IDF changed its doctrine along all of Israel’s borders, emphasizing preemptive action and creating so-called buffer zones in adversaries’ territory.
Over the past 18 months, Israel’s appetite to consolidate buffer zones has only grown. In March 2025, Defense Minister Katz said that the IDF’s expanding ground operations in Gaza were intended, in part, to “capture extensive territory” that would be permanently “added to the State of Israel’s security areas.” In Lebanon, despite signing a ceasefire with Hezbollah in November—and despite the fact that a new, less Hezbollah-friendly government took over Beirut in February—the IDF retains a presence at five strategic points near the border. This is meant to reassure Israeli border communities that they will never again be left defenseless.
Even though Israel’s fatal campaign against Hezbollah and its deterrence efforts against Iran—as well as Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine—had left Assad defenseless, his regime’s collapse took Israel by surprise. Israel had to develop a new Syria strategy on the fly. Immediately, Israel moved to destroy Syrian air force bases, military aircraft, and missile depots; bolstered its border defenses; and took over the UN’s 145-square-mile buffer zone. The IDF erected new posts inside Syria, paved access roads, dug trenches, and positioned hundreds of soldiers there.
WRONG FOOT
Given that Syria’s new regime does not present Israel with an imminent threat, however, this approach has much less strategic merit than it does in Lebanon. The Israeli-Syrian border has remained peaceful throughout the Gaza war, and Israelis living along it have not had to leave. Damascus’s new leaders have repeatedly stressed that they plan to include minorities and secular Syrians in their government and establish their credibility with Western actors. Shara’s government abandoned Syria’s long-standing official anti-Israeli rhetoric. Shara also pledged to uphold the Agreement on Disengagement that Syria and Israel had inked in 1974, which provided for an indefinite cease-fire. “We do not want any conflict, whether with Israel or anyone else,” he declared in December, adding that he would not “let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks.”
It remains to be seen how closely Shara will adhere to these vows. But instead of waiting and seeing, many Israeli leaders have begun to treat Shara’s government as if it is simply destined to be yet another adversary. In late December, the IDF invaded at least two other areas in Syria beyond the buffer zone and increased the frequency and scale of its strikes deep into Syrian territory, although the tempo has declined over the past two weeks. Israel says some of its actions are intended to protect minority groups, particularly the Druze, who are potential allies. Yet many members of the Syrian Druze community view Israel’s claims to be their ally with suspicion: in mid-March, protests broke out in the majority-Druze Syrian town of Suwayda, during which Druze leaders accused Israel of undermining Syria’s territorial integrity. Israel’s attempt to create partnerships with non-Sunni Muslim minorities cuts against most war-weary Syrians’ wish for a unified and stable country.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s insistence that the entirety of Syria south of Damascus must be “demilitarized” is a goal Shara will be hard-pressed to accept, as it would likely mean ceding control over this area. Israel has also been undermining Shara by lobbying the United States to maintain its sanctions on Syria and closely coordinating with Moscow to help Russia keep its military bases. Israel’s overture toward Russia is puzzling, considering that the Russian intervention in Syria to save Assad a decade ago helped entrench Iranian influence in the Middle East.
Israeli leaders seem bent on understanding their country as imperiled.
Israel’s mistrust of Shara’s government constitutes another paradox. Israeli leaders have accused Shara’s team of hiding its true colors: in March, Sa’ar claimed that Shara’s team “were jihadists and remain jihadists, even if some of their leaders have donned suits.” But Israel is counting on Shara’s anti-Iran stance to stop Iran from reestablishing its regional influence. And although undermining Shara’s power may strengthen Israel’s grip on its buffer zone in the short term, the country’s long-term interest is in a stable Syria.
Israel has also been working to prevent Turkey from consolidating influence in Syria. Israel has foiled Turkish efforts to rebuild the Syrian army’s capabilities by bombing air bases that Ankara sought to take over. Israeli official discourse has increasingly treated Turkey as an enemy: a January 2025 report by a government-appointed committee on the defense budget, for instance, referred to the “Turkish threat,” alleging that Turkey hopes to render the Syrian military “a Turkish proxy as part of Turkey’s dream of restoring the Ottoman crown to its former glory.” That, in turn, would “deepen the danger of a direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation.” In late March, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar tweeted that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is “anti-Semitic” and a “threat” to “the region.”
Israeli leaders seem bent on understanding their country as imperiled and tempted to substitute the diminished threat posed by the Iranian axis of resistance with a purported new Turkish one. Erdogan has done his part to damage relations between the countries, in 2024 comparing Netanyahu to Hitler and accusing Israel of war crimes in Gaza. Ankara wants to add Syria to its sphere of influence, which could hinder the Israeli military’s freedom of action and bring Turkish troops to Israel’s doorstep. Yet Turkey is not Israel’s adversary: the two countries, both U.S. allies, share strong economic and security interests, and Israel should not aggravate NATO’s largest military while fighting a multifront war.
OPPORTUNITY COST
Israel’s posture certainly reflects the country’s more externally aggressive post–October 7 mindset. But it also has domestic motives. Netanyahu’s political base relishes social media posts showing IDF tanks cruising Syria on social media. Furthermore, Netanyahu’s coalition likely hopes that offering protection to the Druze in Syria could appeal to members of the Israeli Druze community, who are loyal Israeli citizens and serve in the IDF yet suffer from discrimination compared with the country’s Jewish majority.
But Israel’s approach in Syria is already backfiring. On February 2, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra told The Washington Post that the IDF’s incursions were a “violation against the Syrian people,” a pivot from the Shara regime’s initial practice of not criticizing Israel. He complained that Israel showed little gratitude for how Shara’s takeover helped deter Iran, a common enemy: “They had a problem with Iran; we saved them from Iran.” For several months, Shara refrained from criticizing Israel’s escalatory behavior, which Israeli leaders could have taken as a hopeful sign. But in March, Shara himself began to express anger, defining Israel’s advances as “hostile expansionism.”
In late March and early April, IDF troops in Syria came under fire by unknown militants. If Israel keeps up its aggressive stance, Shara—who has been courting Syrian minorities—could allow or even back such militant groups’ attacks on IDF troops, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Resentment toward the IDF could increase the potential for insurgency, which, in turn, would likely pull the IDF deeper into Syrian territory.
Israel’s approach in Syria is already backfiring.
If the new Syrian government remains moderate and can consolidate its authority, the upside for Israel would be huge. It would have a stable neighbor not beholden to Iran—one that possesses an effective military that can do its own work to address threats from extremist groups. Israel is not a passive bystander to the trajectory of Syrian politics. It can encourage Shara’s moderation by welcoming Damascus’s overtures, such as the arrest, on April 21, of two senior leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror group. Further, Israel should articulate publicly that its territorial advances are designed to be temporary until a responsible force can secure the other side of the border. Until Damascus has such capabilities, Israel should minimize friction with Syria’s population and its new government by reducing its visible military footprint and communicating with Shara’s team through back channels. At the same time, Israel should capitalize on the gains it has made to secure the Israeli-Syrian border by demanding a diplomatic agreement to ensure the protection of Syria’s Druze community and to demilitarize the Golan Heights.
Israel must also change its approach to Turkey. In a meeting with Netanyahu earlier this month, U.S. President Donald Trump praised Erdogan and called for the two countries to repair their relationship. But Trump’s intent to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria may also leave Israel and Turkey to bicker over the country without adult supervision. On April 9, a round of talks began between Israel and Turkey, mediated by Azerbaijan. Israel should use these discussions not only to establish a deconfliction mechanism but to deescalate tensions altogether.
Israel’s current approach resembles its efforts to create a security zone in southern Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s—which resulted in a war of attrition that deepened Lebanese resentment and made it much easier for Hezbollah to take over the country upon the IDF’s withdrawal in 2000. Israel must not repeat this mistake. The Israeli government should work more closely with regional and international partners to keep Syria from again falling into the Iranian orbit as well as to disable and remove the residues of biological and chemical weapons left over from the Assad era. Israel could also relieve Syria’s economic crisis by helping to provide the country with energy, food, and water. That—more than showy military incursions without a complementary diplomatic strategy—will help Israel secure the regional influence it truly wants.
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