This opinion piece by Steven Everts was originally published in Dutch in NRC on 2 May 2025 under the title ‘Voelt Europa de urgentie, of zakt het weg in defaitisme?’. It is reproduced here in English with the permission of NRC.
“Chaos, capriciousness, and amateurism. One day there’s rapprochement and an agreement on raw materials; the next we hear shameless Russian propaganda—straight from the White House. But the trend is clear: Donald Trump wants to get rid of the Ukraine file. How that happens, what others think about it, or the reputational damage for the US—it all seems to matter little. As long as there’s a ‘deal’ and relations with Russia can be restored.
This is the moment of truth for Europe. It’s easy to criticise Trump, but what are we going to do? The hard truth is that Europe, despite tough rhetoric and numerous emergency summits, risks failing the test. The Franco-British plan for a deterrent force on Ukrainian territory appears to be floundering—due to the lack of an American ‘back stop’. Even the Poles have little enthusiasm for joining such a force. And the political unity of the 27 EU member states to extend sanctions against Russia will be even harder to sustain, if the US lifts its own sanctions.
Thus, Europe—including Ukraine—risks being presented with a fait accompli. And not about something marginal, but about the core of our own security.
A serious, realistic plan
We need a serious yet realistic plan to continue supporting Ukraine—diplomatically, financially, and militarily. Ultimately, Ukraine must be able to say ‘no’ to a deal that runs counter to essential European interests. And this is achievable, provided we focus on what truly matters and realise that Ukraine holds more cards than Trump may think.
Yes, Ukraine is war-weary, but certainly not broken. The front has remained largely stable for two years, despite Russia’s numerical advantage. Moscow now relies on North Korean soldiers and increasingly targets civilian infrastructure—despite announced energy and Easter ceasefires. These are not signs of strategic superiority. At the same time, the EU has finally accelerated its artillery production and is on track to match Russia by the end of 2025, while Ukraine is on its way to becoming the world’s largest drone producer. Where a Russian breakthrough seemed realistic a few months ago, that risk has now significantly decreased. In short, the notion that Ukraine must accept any Trump-Putin deal is both incorrect and dangerous.
Diplomatically, Europe must stick to the correct sequencing of steps: first a ceasefire, then a peace agreement on the thorny issues, including security guarantees and provisions for what happens if agreements are violated. Only then should any lifting of sanctions be considered. There is a reason why other peace processes in the world have followed this order: trust must be built, and agreements must be enforceable.
Substantively, Europe must stand firm. Hence, no reward for aggression and no limitation of the right to political self-determination. Concretely, this means no recognition of Crimea or other occupied territories as Russian, and no haggling over EU or NATO accession—those decisions rest with the member states, not Moscow. This position may lead to open conflict with the US and an extremely awkward NATO summit in The Hague at the end of June. But on certain issues, there can be no concessions.
Financially, Europe can certainly compensate for the loss of US support. The US gave around $65 billion to Ukraine in 2024. Translated to the population of the EU, the UK, Norway, and Canada, this amounts to about €100 per person per year. That’s substantial, but not insurmountable.
The military domain is the biggest challenge. Yet even here, the tide is turning. Roughly 40% of what Ukraine needs is now domestically produced. In this regard, the Danish approach deserves emulation: not donating weapons, but co-producing them locally. It’s cheaper and enables Europe to benefit from technological breakthroughs occurring in Ukraine.
Instead of clinging to the idea of European troops stationed at or just behind the front line, we could better invest our resources and energy into training Ukrainian troops—on Ukrainian soil. It’s cheaper and more effective than current training efforts in EU member states. Of course, not all US-supplied military equipment can be easily replaced or bought with European money. And intelligence dependence on the US remains high. But there is a realistic path forward to keep Ukraine in the fight.
The core question is whether Europe feels the urgency and acts accordingly, or sinks into defeatism and resignation. Politically, getting all 27 EU countries on board will be difficult. Brussels fears some countries have reached their limit, and that EU sanctions may not be renewed if Trump scraps the US ones. But handing Putin a gift of roughly €200 billion in frozen assets would be catastrophic. That’s why Brussels is eyeing a Plan B: decisions on economic sanctions could, in principle, be made by a qualified majority, thus sidestepping the need for unanimity. This would avoid blackmail by one or two member states. EU treaties allow for this, but political reasons have so far prevented it. Overcoming the impasse of individual vetoes is essential—not only for Ukraine’s future, but for EU foreign policy more generally.
From dependency to strength
The main objective is clear: keep Ukraine—and therefore ourselves—secure. Invest in our own strength and thereby become less dependent on Trump’s whims. If he says: “Over to you,” Europe must be able to reply: “We got this.”
