Albania has done it again. After hosting the Berlin Process in 2023 and the EU–Western Balkans Summit in 2022, Tirana welcomed the sixth edition of the European Political Community (EPC) on 16 May. With 45 heads of state and government in attendance, alongside EU institutional leaders, the city once again demonstrated its capacity to host major diplomatic events on a par with any European capital. From Prague to Chișinău, Granada to London, Budapest to Tirana, the EPC has proven its flexibility by rotating between EU and non-EU hosts. Next stop: Denmark in 2025.
By successfully hosting the summit, Albania is making a strong case for itself as one of the most prepared candidates for EU accession – matching the progress of Montenegro, with both widely seen as frontrunners. But while Tirana delivered on logistics, the political weight of the EPC still falls short of expectations.
Rather than letting the EPC drift, the EU Member States should take the lead in moving beyond symbolism and invest the format with real political weight. That means clarifying its purpose, anchoring it in key EU priorities, and ensuring it delivers more than high-level dialogue. Otherwise, it may survive in form, but not in impact. And here is why.
All form, little follow-through
First, beyond uniting like-minded partners, one of the core aims of the EPC was to bring Europe’s wider neighbourhood into the room – and into the conversation. As President Macron framed it at its inception, the EPC was meant to ‘anchor these countries in Europe, to increase coordination with the European Union, without confusing all the agendas. That’s the heart of this proposal’. From the onset, the EPC has therefore also served a second purpose: offering a sense of reassurance. It was designed to signal that these countries are not being sidelined – that they remain part of Europe’s political core, even if EU accession remains a distant prospect, not least due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. But nearly three years on, that vision has become less clear. Eastern neighbours – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – were soon granted an EU membership perspective, while Albania and Montenegro have accelerated their accession processes.
Second, topics such as migration, energy cooperation, security and democratic resilience, and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have become staples of the EPC agenda. Yet they continue to be addressed in broad, informal terms – without clear commitments, implementation plans, or institutional mechanisms to ensure follow-up. While the format allows for open political dialogue, the EPC’s lack of structure and accountability risks reducing it to a talking shop rather than a platform capable of shaping joint European responses to shared challenges. This loose arrangement also makes it easier for countries to disengage, as illustrated by Türkiye’s absence from two summits in 2023 and another in 2024.
The EPC’s lack of structure and accountability risks reducing it to a talking shop rather than a platform capable of shaping joint European responses to shared challenges.
Third, the war in Ukraine has triggered broader reflections on the need for European mobilisation. The EPC was, in part, a response to the urgency created by Russia’s aggression and the desire to bring together a wider circle of European partners. While security and support for Ukraine remain central to the EPC’s agenda, most substantive decisions are still being made elsewhere, within the EU framework or through bilateral formats. The EU-UK summit of 19 May, marked by the signing of a Defence and Security Partnership is one example where concrete steps are being taken. Europe already has multiple platforms for coordination, including the European Council, G7, and G20. Without the ability to shape decisions, the EPC risks becoming little more than a forum for informal exchanges. But this endeavour also carries a downside that should be acknowledged. In practice, building consensus has become increasingly difficult, even within the EU-27. So, ensuring a buy-in from broader partners might become a significant obstacle. And this at a time when the urgency for united and rapid responses to geopolitical challenges has never been greater.
Time to choose: Permanent platform or political theatre?
Tirana showed the format still has momentum. But without substance, momentum fades fast. The EPC was born out of crisis, and in that context, its value is clear. It has helped mobilise partners, foster dialogue, and project unity in the face of external threats. With Russia’s war on Ukraine likely to remain a long-term threat and amid a growing sense of global instability, the format has gained merit in becoming a forum for informal crisis talks. But after three years, its limitations are equally visible. Without a clear purpose, structured follow-up, and a defined role in Europe’s institutional landscape, the EPC risks slipping into irrelevance.
The EPC should be an opportunity, not a placeholder, for shaping Europe’s wider political future.
If the EU Member States want this format to matter, they should stop treating the EPC as a token side project and start shaping its direction with intent. That does not mean turning it into another EU-led initiative, but it does require political investment to clarify its role, set minimal institutional parameters, and create stronger linkages to EU-level policymaking. EPC discussions should be tied to EU policies on enlargement, migration, energy, and security, so partner countries feel they are influencing – not merely observing – the debate. The EPC needs a clearly defined added value, whether as a pre-accession space, a geopolitical coordination forum, or a flexible response platform. It should be an opportunity, not a placeholder, for shaping Europe’s wider political future.
The EPC cannot afford to become just another photo-op in Europe’s crowded calendar. It needs to justify its existence or risk fading into irrelevance.
